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Sl'l'CATIOX III 
BELLIGERENCY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 
States X and Y are at 'var. Other states neutral. 
(a) 1"'he Xerxes, a cruiser of State X, is refueling 
iro1n the Petro, a tanker, in quiet 'vater 1nore than 3 
1niles fron1 the coast of State R, the only state ·within 100 
1niles, but inside and more than 3 1niles fron1 a reef off 
the coast of State R. The reef is generally sub1nerged, 
but certain rocks are exposed at lo'v tide. State Y pro-
tests to State R. State R takes no action upon the pro-
test. A sub1narine, Y 50, of State Y, then sinks the 
Petro. The Y 50 is brought to the surface by depth 
bo1nbs fro1n the Xerxes, but succeeds in beaching itself 
on a reef less than 3 miles fron1 State R. The Xerxes 
takes off the crew of the 17 50 and 1nakes then1 prisoners 
of war. 
Have States X, Y, and R grounds for protests~ 
(b) Later the X enophon, a con1panion ship of the 
X ~rxes, runs upon the reef at. a point 61f2 1niles fro1n any 
point of State R. A salvage ship flying the flag of and 
belonging to a corporation of State R is endeavoring to 
get the Xenophon off. A snbn1arine of State Y, the Y 
51 appears and demands that salvaging operations cease, 
that the crew of the Xenophon be taken on board the 
salvaging ship as the Y 51 is about to destroy the Xeno-
phon by torpedo fire. A cruiser of State R is standing 
by, and the Xenophon's arma1nent and boats are intact. 
vVha t action ~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) As neutral State R takes no action, the action of 
subn1arine Y 50 is lawful. The defense of cruiser 
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X e1·xes is la ,vful, but the taking of the cre'v of the 
beached Y 50 as prisoners of \var is not lawful. 
State X has no ground for valid protest. 
State Y may protest against the taking of the cre'v 
of Y 50 as prisoners of \var. 
State R 1nay protest against the action of the Xerxes 
in entering its 'vaters and n1aking the cre'v of Y 50 
prisoners of war. 
(b) I' he place of salvaging is in the high sea and the· 
salvaging operations are la,vful. The salvaging vessel 
is under obligation to cease operations but under no 
obligation to take the cre-,v of the Xenophon on board. 
'fhe relatiYe 'veakness of the submarine Y 51 gives it no-
right to demand exceptional services from the salvaging 
vessel. 'fhe .LYenophon's ar1nament and boats being in-
tact, the conditions for 'vhich the Hague-Geneva Con-
vention provides have not arisen, and the salvaging v-es--
sel 1nay decline to take any action except to discontinue· 
salvaging operations unless upon agreement of all 
parties. 
Situations I and II, 1931.-In Situations I and II 
above, 1nany citations equally applicable to Situation 
III are gi veiL These are not repeated in the follo,ving 
pages but 1nay be found under the appropriate heading 
from the index. 
Discussions at Naval TV aJ" 0 ollege.-'fhe problen1 of 
taking on fuel for yessels of 'var in neutral jurisdiction 
has been considered in v-arious aspects at this Naval 'V ar 
College. In the early part of the nineteenth century, it 
\vas usually son1e aspect of coaling that 'vas discussed. 
In 1901 coal as contraband and the supply to belligerent 
ships 'vas mentioned. ln 1902 the amount that might be 
taken \vas considered. In 1903 the proposed Naval 'Var 
Code 'vas before the conference but in 1904 the taking of 
coal from supply ships arose. In 1905 the question \vas 
" \vhat are the circumstances under which food stuffs 
and coal, ancl ra'v Inaterial, such as cotton, can be de-
clared to be contraband~ " The supplyir;g of fuel or oB 
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to belligerent vessels in neutral ports ·was one of the 
topics in 1906. The status of a collier in a foreign port 
and the nature of collier service 'vere topics in 1907. 
Coaling in neutral waters became the object of further 
attention in 1908 in consequence of the provisions of The 
Hague Conventions of 1907 and the discussions at The 
Hague Conference of 1907. In 1909 the Declaration of 
London brought many problems of neutral rights and 
obligations before the conference, and in 1910 one of the 
situations related primarily to coaling 'vithin neutral 
jurisdiction. Such recurrence of the topic of coaling 
gives evidence of the problems- 'vhich centered about tak-
ing on fuel in the first decade of the nineteenth century. 
Geneva A.lf'bit1·ation, 1871.-The Geneva Arbitration 
Tribunal under the treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, 
relating particularly to the Alabama clai1ns, gave n1uch 
attention to coaling as coal was at that ti1ne a great 
source of 1noti ve power. Reference has often been n1ade 
to the arguments and discussion before the tribunal in 
the publications of the Naval \V ar College, but it seems 
desirable to repeat some of these, as the a ward of the 
tribunal and the articles of the treaty of \V ash-
ington have become the basis of modern neutrality 
proclamations. 
The rules of the treaty of Washington \vhich relate 
to this matter were as stated in Article VI, that-
A neutral Government is bound-
First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, 
or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has 
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry 
on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to 
use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction 
of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such 
vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within 
such jurisdiction, to warlike use. 
Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use 
of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the 
other, or for the purpose of renewal or augmentation of military 
supplies or anns, or the recruitment of men. 
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'l'hirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, 
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any viola-
tion of the foregoing obligations and duties. (17 U. S. Stat. 863.) 
Early AnLerican cases.-As early as 1793 the question 
of capture in American 'vaters arose. The French frig-
ate Embuscade captured the British ship Grange in the 
Dela,vare Bay. The Attorney General advised the Gov-
ernment that the Bay 'vas 'vi thin the jurisdiction of the 
United States and that the G1?ange should be released 
and the Grange ·was released. (An1er. State Papers, 1 
Foreign Relations, p. 148.) Jefferson at this period rec-
ognized that the obligation to 1naintain neutrality ex-
tended to 3 1niles. 'fhe neutrality act of June 5, 1794, 
gave for the United States clear principles of conduct 
'vhich in later years have been 'videly follo,ved. Article 
\TII of the Jay treaty n1entions specifically the satisfac-
tion of claims of British 1nerchants and others vvho have 
" sustained loss and damage by reason of the capture of 
their vessels and merchandise, taken 'vithin the li1nits 
and jurisdiction of the States." lJnder this article the 
British brig Pilgri1n, captured October 6, 1793, 'vithin 
21h 1niles from the United States, 'vas adjudged to be 
restored. 
During the vV ar of 1812 there were several cases in 
'vhich belligerents 1nade use of territorial waters in hos-
tilities. The American frigate Essex was attacked by 
the British frigate Phoebe and sloop Oherub in 1814 in 
the territorial 'vaters off Valparaiso and the Levant, an 
American prize, 'vas chased into Port Pray a and cap-
tured 'vhile there. The American privateer General 
Ar1nstrong 'vas destroyed by a British squadron in the 
sa1ne year in the port of Fayal. Such acts led to vigor-
ous protests on the part of the United States to the neu-
tral states. The case of the General Ar1nstrong 'vas 
1nade the basis of a long pending clai1n against Portugal 
'vhich was at length referred to Louis Napoleon, 'vho 
in 1852 rendered an a'vard to the effect that Portugal 
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\vas not liable as the local authorities had not been called 
upon to furnish protection, the American privateer hav-
ing fired upon a British longboat \vhich the captain of 
the General Arn~strong maintained \Vas planning to 
board the privateer. The claim caine before the Court 
of Claims of the United States on the ground that it 
\vas not properly placed before Louis Napoleon and \vas 
disallowed. Congress subsequently granted nearly $71,-
000 to the clai1nant as Senator Platt recognizing the 
patriotism of the personnel of the Gene?~al Armstrong, 
said also "it appeals strongly to the imagination." In 
the case of the Anna, which the British had captured 
\vithin 3 miles of the coast of the United States off the 
mouth of the Mississippi and brought to England, Sir 
William Scott (Lord Stowell) said in 1805 : 
The conduct of the captors has on all points been llighly repre-
hensible. * * * In such a case it would be falling short of 
the justice due to the violated rights of America, and to the indi-
vicluals who haYe sustained injury by such n1isconduct, if I did 
not follow up the restitution which has passed on the former clay, 
with a decree of costs and dan1ages. ( 5 C. Robinson Ad1niralty 
Reports, p. 373.) 
The U. S. S. 1¥ achusett on October 7, 1864, captured 
in the harbor of Bahia, Brazil, and took to the United 
States the Confederate cruiser Florida. Brazil den1anded 
reparation. The President elisa vo\ved the act, suspended 
the co1nmander of the 1¥ achusett, dismissed the consul 
who had advised the capture, ordered a salute of the 
Brazilian flag, released the cre\v of the Florida and the 
Secretary of State declared the capture of the Florida to 
be " an unauthorized, unlawful, and indefensible exer-
cise of the naval force of the United States, \Vi thin a 
foreign country, in defiance of its established and duly 
recognized Government." 
It is clear that hostilities \vithin neutral n1aritin1e jur-
isdiction have been increasingly regarded as \Yithout the 
sanction of law. The obligations of a neutral to prevent 
even the use of its territory as a base is si1nilarly evident 
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and "\vas brought out clearly in the Alabama a ward and 
in neutrality proclamations since 1871. 
The "Twee Gebroeders."-One of the early cases in 
regard to belligerent use of territorial waters, arose in 
consequence of a claim that on July 14, 1799, four Dutch 
ships had been taken while they "\Vere in neutral terri-
torial "\Vaters. This case relating particularly to the 
Twee Gebroeders came before the British Prize Court in 
1800. 
It is said that the ship was, in all respects, observant of the 
peace of the neutral territory; that nothing was done by her 
which could affect the right of territory, or from which any 
inconvenience could arise to the country within whose limits 
she was lying, inasn1uch as the hostile force which she employed 
\Vas applied to the captured vessel lying out of the territory. 
But that is a doctrine that goes a great deal too far. I am of 
opinion that no use of a neutral territory, for the purposes of 
war, is to be permitted. I do not say remote uses, such as 
procuring provisions and refreslunents, and acts of that nature, 
which the law of nations universally tolerates; but that no 
proximate acts of war are in any manner to be allowed to origi-
nate on neutral grounds; and I cannot but think that such an 
act as this, that a ship should station herself on neutral terri-
tory, and send out her boats on hostile enterprises, is an act of 
hostility n1uch too imn1ediate to be permitted. For, suppose that 
even a direct hostile use should be required to bring it within 
the 11rohibition of the law of nations, nobody will say that the 
very act of sending out boats to effect a capture is not itself an 
act directly hostile, not complete, indeed, but inchoate, and 
clothed with all the characters of hostility. If this could be 
defended, it might as well be said that a ship lying in a neutral 
station might fire shot on a vessel lying out of the neutral terri-
tory; the injury in that case would not be consumrnated nor 
received on neutral ground; but no one· would say that such 
an act would not be an hostile act, immediately commenced 
within the neutral territory. And what does it signify to the 
nature of the act, cons~dered for the present purpose, whether 
I sent out a cannon-shot which shall compel the submission of 
a vessel lying at two miles distance, or whether I send out a 
boat armed and manned, to effect the very same thing at the 
same distance? It is in both cases the direct act of the vessel 
lying in neutral ground. The act of hostility actually begins, 
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in the latter case, with the launching and manning and arming 
the boat that is sent out on such an errand of force. (The T1oee 
Geb~·oeclers, 3 C. Robinson, p. 162.) 
Gern~an ordinance, 1909.-The Ger1nan ordinance of 
September 30, 1909, made provisions in regard to the 
right of capture "\vhich would in general apply to hos-
tilities in. neutral waters as follows : 
Art. 3. The right of capture does not bold-
( a) vVithin neutral waters; i. e., within a sea area, 3 sea 
miles wide, measured from the low-water coast line, bordering 
the coast and the islands and indentations appertaining thereto. 
As appertaining are : Islands· which are not farther than 6 
n1iles distant from one of the mainland coasts of the same State; 
indentations whose coast is exclusively in the possession of the 
neutral State and whose opening is 6 sea miles or less 'vide. 
(b) 'Vi thin those 'vaters which are by convention closed to 
operations of war or to ships of war. These are: 
" (a) The Suez Canal, including its entrance harbors and a 
sea area of 3 sea 1niles beyond them. (Art. 4, sec. 1, of the treaty 
of Constantinople of October 29, 1888.) 
" ( (3) 'l'he Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, so far as Turkey 
is not herself a belligerent; (Treaty of London concerning nar-
row seas of July 13, 1841; art. 10 of the Peace of Paris of 
l\iarch 30, 1865, and Appendix I thereto; art. 2 of the treaty of 
London of l\1arch 13, 1871; art. 63 of the treaty of Berlin of 
July 13, 1878.) 
" ( 'Y) The waters of Corfu and Paxe, so far as no other 
power than Greece, Great Britain, France, Russ.ia, Austria-
Hungary, and Germany are parties to the war. (Art. 2. of the 
treaty of London of November 14, 1863, and art. 2 of the treaty 
of London of March 24, 1864.) 
"(o) The mouths of the Danube. (Art. 42 of the treaty of 
Berlin of July 13, 1878.) 
" (e) The mouths of the Congo and Niger and the coastal 
waters adjacent thereto. (General agreement of the Berlin con-
ference of February 26, 1888, arts. 25 and 33.) The right of cap-
ture may also be no further exercised when a merchant vessel 
during the course of pursuit or while under visit and search 
reaches the waters referred to in (a) and ( b) . " ( 1925, Naval 
'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 3.) 
The Ger1nan Prize Code of 1916 (art. 3) states that 
"' a 'var vessel n1ay, of course, pass through neutral terri-
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torial w·aters 111 order to hold up a ship outside these 
li1nits. ~' 
LV or~cegian coast .-""\Vhile this Situation III refers to 
no specific coast and while the same type of coast forma-
tion so far as jurisdictional problems may arise in areas 
of shallo'v \Vaters or \Vhere coral reefs prevail, the Nor-
\Yegian coast has many striking characteristic~. These 
\vere 1nentioned in a report presented by a Royal coin-
mittee in 1924. The committee said: 
~rhe coastal waters of Norway with their outlying banks are 
characteristic and quite different from those of other European 
countries. They also vary greatly in difterent parts of the coun-
try. This remarkable character of tbe coast is due to the fact 
"that :Korway is a mountainous country-an irregular mass of 
roek-furrowe<l anrl cleft by an infinite number of gullies and 
Yalleys. The coast line winds in and out of bays and fjords, 
\Vhich in many places cut Yery deeply into the mainland. Thus: 
the coast is highly variable and this nniability is intensified by 
the numerous large and s1nall islands, islets, holms and rocks that 
lie strewn at Yarious distances from the mainland proper. Only 
two comparatively short stretches of coast are \vithout their 
skerry guard, viz, Jaederen in the southwest, and east l\1ager¢en 
on the northern coast. Along these stretches of coast that possess. 
a skerry guard, i. e. the predominant part of the coast, tall 
lJOintecl mountain tops rise from the bottom of the sea nearly 
up to the surface of the \Vater. These hidden rocks or shallows. 
with diYiding furrows and channels, cause still greater variability 
in the fonnation of the sea floor. As a rule the latter descends 
from the shore in terraces with steep, mountainous precipices. 
The fonnation con1n1on to other countries, viz. banks sloping 
eYenly from the shore to an outer ridge of banks, is very rare in 
Norway, and is limited more or less to the stretches where there 
is no skerry guard. (The Principal Facts concerning Norwegian 
Territorial 'Vaters, p. 5.) 
The early claims as to exclusive rights in fisheries off 
the shore seen1 to have been acquiesed in by other mari-
tin1e states and other ~ates made similar claims. When 
these claims overlapped, conflicts arose and \Vere often 
adjusted by treaties. The Scandinavian states main-
tained the 4-n1ile limit as a rule and before the ""\V orld 
""\V ar regarded this as the neutral belt in time of \Var. 
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The report o£ the co1nmittee also says after referring to 
treaties o£ the fifteenth century : 
During the two centuries then ensuing, the l(ings of Xorway 
felt induced to depart gradually from their old policy of claim-
ing dominion over these Northern "·a ters, and confined thenl-
seh·es by degrees to asserting sovereignty o,·er certain stretches 
of water on the coasts. Finally, the range of vision was in 
certain respects considered and maintained as the lin1it of Nor-
wegian territorial waters, also as regards the Northern seas. 
According to a Royal Decree of 20th June, 1691, the entire sea 
between Norway and Jutland, outside the range of vision from 
land, was to be considered as neutral waters. Further, by a 
treaty of December, 1691, between Norway and Denn1ark, on 
the one part, and Great .Britain and the Netherlands on the other 
pai·t, it was expressly st:pulated that enen1ies of the two latter 
countries were not to be allowed to capture Yessels belonging to 
the subjects of these countries within sight of any land belonging 
to the Danish Norwegian K:ing. The Admiralty likewise applied 
this boundary lin1it in connection "·ith the maintenance of neu-
trality. The range of vision was reckoned as 4 or 5 geographical 
miles fron1 the outermost islets. (Ibid., p. 47.) 
The'' Bangor," 1915.-0n 1\farch 14, 1915, the Bangor, 
a steamship flying the N or,vegian flag and apparently 
under control o£ a Ger1nan agent, w·as 1net at the mouth 
o£ the Strait o£ Magellan by a British vessel o£ \Var and 
put in charge o£ a prize crew·. The Bangor ".,.as then 
taken to the Falkland Islands. Before the prize court 
the o'vners admitted liability to conclen1nation •• unless 
she \Vas immune £rom capture on the technical ground 
that she was at the time in \Vaters alleged to be terri-
torial 'vaters o£ a neutral State." 
~rhe vessel was captured in the Strait of l\lagellan. Accord- · 
ing to the entry in the log she was captured when she was in 
the n1iddle of the Strait of l\lagellan, about opposite Port Ta1nar 
anchorage. This agreed with the state1nent of the British naval 
officers. The Strait of l\lagellan is a<11nitted to be 7 miles wide 
at that place. Strictly, therefore, the 1niddle would not be 
within 3 miles of the land on either side. 
The ship·s 1naster gave evidence that he took bearings which 
fixed his position 1nueh nearer the ~outh shore than the line 
n1iclway between the land on the 110rth and south sides. His 
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eYidence is not worthy of any credence, and I cannot accept any 
part of it as being true. Accordingly, if it is tnaterial to estab-
lish that the capture took place within 3 miles, or a marine-
league, of eitllet· shore, the claimants haYe not proved to tny 
satisfaction that it did. 
'I'he limits of territorial waters, in relation to national and 
international rights and priYileges, haYe of recent years been sub-
ject to much discussion. It may well b~ that the old marine 
league, which for long determined the boundaries of territorial 
waters, ought to be extended by reason of the enlarged range of 
guns used for shore protection. This case does not, in my Yiew, 
c·all for any pronouncement upon that question. I am content to· 
decide the que~tion of law raised by the claimants upon the as-
sunlption that the capture took place within the territorial· 
waters of the Republic of Chile. 
This assumption, of course, does not imply any expression of ' 
opinion as to the character of the Strait of l\1agellan as between 
Chile and other nations. 
This strait connects the two Yast free oceans of the Atlantic 
and the Pacific. As such, the strait must be considered free for 
the commerce of all nations passing between the two oceans. 
In 1879, the GoYernment of the United States of America de-
clared that it woul<_l not tolerate exclusiYe claims by any nation 
whatsoeYer to the Strait of )Ingellan, and would hold responsible 
any GoYernment thnt un<lertook. no matter on what pretext, to 
lay any impost on its commerce through the strait. 
Later, in 1881, the R<-'public of Chile entered into a treaty with 
the Argentine Repul>lic by which the Strait of l\Iagellan was de-
clared to he neutralized for eYer, and free navigation was guar-
anteed to the flags of all nations. 
I ha Ye referred to these matters in order to show that there i~ 
a right of free 11assage through the Strait of l\Iagellan for com-
mercial purposes. It js not inconsistent with this that during war 
between any nations entitled to use it for comn1erce the Strait of 
l\Iagellan should be regarded in whole or in part as the territorial 
waters of Chile, whose lands bound it on both sides. ( [19-16] 
P. 11. 181 ; 5 Lloyd's Prize Cases, pp. 308, 313.) 
\Vhile the court asstuned for the purpose of this case 
that the Bangor was 'vithin territorial waters, it 'vas 
stated this 'Yas a 1natter bet,veen the neutral and bel-
ligerent state and did not affect the rule relating to cap-
ture as bet,veen the belligerents, and the vessel and cargo 
'vere conden1ned. 
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The "Dresden," 1915.-0ne of the cases 'vhich arose 
in the first year of the World War gave rise to 1nuch 
discussion. 'fhis vvas the case of the Dresden, a German 
cruiser anchored, within 500 meters from the shore, in 
Ctunberland Bay, in the island of Mas-a-'fierra, belong-
ing to the Republic of Chile. The British fleet attacked 
the Dresden. The British Government stated they 'vere 
"prepared to offer a full and ample apology," and then 
intimated that they were aiding in maintaining Chilean 
neutrality, etc., though affirming that they did " not 
·wish to qualify the apology." The correspondence at 
the time, 'vhich 'vas important, vvas as follo,vs : 
THE CHILEAN l\1INISTER TO SIR Enw ARD GREY 
·(Translation.) 
:Sir, 
(Received lVlarch 26) 
In compliance with instructions fron1 my Governn1ent~ I ltave 
the honour to inform your Excellency of the facts wh~ch led 
to the sinking of the German cruiser Dres-den in· Chilean terri-
torial waters, as they appear to be established by the infcrma-
tion in the possession of the Chilean Government. 
The cruiser cast anchor on the 9th March in Cumberland Bay, 
in the island of lVlas-a-Tierra, belonging to the Juan Fernandez 
group, 500 metres from the shore, and her co!llmander asked the 
Maritime Governor of the port for permission to remain there 
for eight days for the purpose of repairing her engines, which 
were, he said, out of order. The Maritime Governor refused to 
grant the request, as he considered it unfounded, and ordered 
the captain to leave the bay within 24 hours, threatening to 
intern the cruiser if her stay were prolonge·d beyond that 11eriod. 
Upon the expiry of the time stated the Mar.itime Governor pro-
ceeded to notify the captain of the Dresden that he hart incurred 
the penalty imposed, and he immediately reported the ~ituation 
which had arisen to the Governor of the Republic. l\leanwhile 
on the 14th l\1arch, a British naval squadron, composed of the 
cruisers J(ent and Glasgow and the armed transport Orama, ar-
rived at Cumberland Bay and immediately opened fire upon the 
Dresden while she lay at anchor. The l\laritilne Governor who 
was making his way towards the Glasgow in order to carry out 
the usual obligations of courtesy, was compelled to return to land. 
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'.rhe Dresden hoisted a flag of truce, and despatched one of her 
officers to inform the Glasgow that she ·was in neutral waters. 
a circumstance disregarded by the British naval squadron, 'vhich 
summoned the Dresden to surrender, warning her that if she re 4 
fused she would be destroyed. The captain of the Dresden then 
gave orders to blow up the powder magazine and sink the ship. 
The act of hostility committed in Chilean territorial waters by 
the British naval squadron has painfuUy ·surprised my Government. 
'.rhe internment of the Dresden had been notified to her cap-
tain by the l\1arithne Governor of .Juan Fernandez, and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic, having been informed of what had 
{)CCurred, would have proceeded to the subsequent steps had it 
not been for the inte1·vention of . the British naval squadron. 
Having regard to the geographical position of the islands of Juan 
Fernandez and to the difficulty of cmnmnnication with the main-
land, the only authority able to act in the matter did everything 
possible from the outset, and the internnient of the Dresden was 
as effective and complete as the circtnnstances 'vould penn it 
'vhen she was attacked by the British naval squadron. Even 
-supposing that the British force feared that the Dresden in-
tended to escape and to ignore the n1easures taken by the l\fari-
time Governor of Juan Fernandez, and that this apprehension 
"\Vas adduced as the reason which detennined its action, it should 
still be observed that the close watch which the British naval 
squadron could itself exercise precluded the possibility of the 
atte1npt. l\1oreover, no such eventuality "·as contemplated by 
the British squadron which, as I have said, did not give the 
l\Iaritime Governor of l\fas-a-Tierra the opportunity of explain-
ing to the naval officer in command of the island the state of the 
Dresden in Cumberland Bar. The officer in command of the 
squadron acted a priori 'vithout pausing to consider that his 
.action constituted a serious offence against the sovereignty of 
the country in whose territorial waters he was at the time. The 
traditions of the British navy are such that I feel convinced 
that if the officer who commanded the British squadron had 
received the l\laritime Governor, who was going on board his 
ship in the fulfillnent of his duty, and had been informed of the 
state of the interned vessel, he would not have opened fire upon 
her and would not have brought about the situation which now 
constrains 1ny Governtnent, in defence of their sovereign rights, 
to formulate the n1ost energetic protest to His Britannic 
l\Iajesty's Government. 
Your Excellency will not be surprised that the attitude of the 
naval squadron should have aroused such deep feeling in Chile 
if you bear in n1incl the fact that the British warshir>s composing 
106 BELLIGERENCY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 
it had receiYed, shortl~T before and upon repeated occasions, con-
vincing proofs of the cordial friendship ·which unites us to Great 
Britain, a ncl which · finds its clearest and strongest expressi ' ,ll in 
onr respective navies. They had been supplied in the ports of the 
republic with e\'erything which it was pennissible for us to fur-
nish consistent with our neutrality in the present European con-
flict. Nothing, therefore, could be a more painful surprise to us 
than to see our exceedingly corclial and friendly attitude repaid 
by an act \Vhich bears unfortunately all the evidences of con-
teinpt for our sovereign right~, although it is probable that nothing 
was further fron1 the n1inds of those by wllo1n it \Vas unthinkingly 
conunittecl. 
Nor will your Excellency be astonishell that n1y GoYenunent 
should show themselves to be very jealous of the rights and pre· 
rogatlves inherent in the exercise of sovereignty. Nations which 
lack powerful Inaterial 1neans of 1naking their rights respected 
have no other guarantee and protection for their life and pros-
perity than the clear and perfect understanding and the exact and 
scrupulous fulfilhnent of the obligations incun1bent upon the1n 
towards other nations, and the right to de1nand that other nations 
shall equally observe their duties towards thmn. Few nations 
have given 1nore convincing proofs than Great Britain of their 
desire to comply with international obligations and to require 
compliance frmn others, and few have shown n1ore eloquently 
their respect for the r~ghts and prerogatives both of great and 
sn1all nations. These facts convince my Govennnent that His 
Britannic :Majesty's Government will give then1 satisfaction for 
the ac~ committed by the British naval forces of a character to 
correspond with the frankly cordial relations existing between 
them. Nothing could be n1ore deeply deplored by the Chilean 
Goveriunent than that the traditional bonds of friendship uniting 
the two peoples, which n1y Government value so highly and upon 
which they base so n1any hopes of new and mutual benefits, should 
fail to derive on this occasion additional strength fron1 the test 
to which circumstances have subjected then1. 
I have, &c. 
AGUSTINE EDWARDS. 
No. 2. SIR EDW~\.RD GREY TO THE CHILEAN J\liNISTER 
FoREiGN OFFICE!, jjf.arch 30, 1915. 
Sir, 
HIS Majesty's GoYernnle)lt, after recei\·ing the eommunication 
from the Chilean Government of the 26th J\larch, deeply regret 
that any misunderstanding should have arisen which should be a 
cause of complaint to the Chilean Government; and, on the facts 
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as stated in the communication made to them, they are prepared 
to offer a full and ample apology to the Chilean Government. 
His l\Iajesty's Governn1ent, before receiving the communka-
tion from the Chilean Government, could only conjecture the 
actual facts at the thne when the Dresden was discovered by the 
British squadron; and even now they are not in possession of a 
full account of his action by the captain of the Glasgow. Such 
information as they have points to the fact that the Dresden had 
not accepted internment, and still had her colours flying and her 
guns trained. If this was so, and if there were no 1neans a vail-
able on the spot and at the moment for enforcing the decision of 
the Chilean authorities to intern the Dresden she might obviously, 
had not the British ships taken action, have escaped again to 
attack British commerce. It is believed that the island where 
the Dresden had taken refuge is not connected with the n1ainland 
by cable. In these circumstances, if the Dresden still had her 
colours flying and her guns trained, the captain of the Glasgow 
probably assumed, especially in view of the past action of the 
Dresden, that she was defying the Chilean authorities and abusing 
Chilean neutrality, and \Vas only awaiting a favourable oppor-
tunity to sally out and attack British cominer~ce again. 
If these really were the circun1stances, His l\iajesty's Govern-
ment cannot but feel that they explain the action taken by the 
captain of the British ship; but, in view of the length of time that 
it may take to clear up all the circumstances and of the communi-
cation that the Chilean Govenunent have made of the view that 
they take from the information they have of the circumstances, 
His l\Iajesty's Government do not wish to qualify the apology that 
they now present to the Chilean Government. 
I have, &c. 
E. GREY. 
(British Parlia1nentary Papers, lV1i~. No.9 [1915], [Cd. 7859].) 
Inviolability of neutral waters.-Neutral waters, while 
generally open to innocent passage o£ belligerent vessels 
in time of vvar, may be closed and have been closed to 
vessels of war and vessels assimilated thereto. 
A vessel in distress is, however, permitted to enter and 
is granted necessary asylum and may make such 
repairs as are needed to make the vessel seaworthy. If a 
vessel enters neutral waters to escape capture: the neutral 
state is usually under obligation to intern the vessel after 
24 hours' sojourn. 
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A.. vessel of 'var might, from 'vithin neutral 'vaters, 
resist an attack or a continuation of an operation, but 
"·hen the vessel in neutral waters ceases operations or is 
no longer able to continue the resistance, no further 
belligerent action may be taken. 
\Vhile it 1night be possible to permit a vessel of 'var 
-of one belligerent to rescue the distressed cre'v · of a 
vessel of war of another belligerent even in territorial 
w·aters of a. neutral, this would be merely as an act of 
.l1umanity and not as an act of 'var and the cre'v should 
be turned over to the neutral state or should be merely 
·detained. 
The "Thor," 1914.-In the Royal Court of St. Lucia 
·On October 30, 1914, a decision 'vas rendered in the case 
-of the Thor, a Nor·wegian steamer loaded with coal origi-
nally chartered by the Inter-American Steamship Line; 
later receiving on board a German supercargo in the per-
.son of one Weiler, a chief petty officer of the German 
Naval Reserve who gave the captain of the Thor the 
following letter : 
'Ve beg to inform you that we have re-let the steamer for 
.about three months to the Hamburg-Amerika Line, of New York, 
and in accordance with clause 12 they will send a supercargo 
·with your steamer whose instructions you will please follo,v. 
\Ve request you to do all possible for the interests of the Ham-
burg-Amerika Line; and their superintendent, who goes with the 
stean1er, has instructions to allow you very liberal gratuities. 
1"he judge in this case after considering that fron1 
_August 9 to August 26 the Thor was "steaming up and 
do,vn 'vith t'vo German colliers and one other neutral 
·collier chartered by a German firn1, all clearly, 'vaiting 
for something to coal " said : 
It therefore becon1es necessary to consider whether her be-
haviour a1nounte(l to unneutral service, and for that purpose to 
ascertain what Inoclification, if any, has been effected by the 
Declaration of London in the law on that point. 
The IiJnglish rule was this : "A neutral vessel charteretl or em-
ployed by a belligerent Government to carry a cargo on its 
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IJehalf and acting under the orders or direction of that Govern-
ment or of its officers is liable to conde1nnation as an enen1y ship, 
together with the cargo so carried "-The Rebecca 1811 (2 Acton, 
119). The formula submitted to the Conference was more epi-
grammatic, but equally effective; it provided that 1nerchant ves-
sels "entierement ou specialement au service du belligerant 
ennemi" snould lose their neutral character. (1 Trehern, British 
and Colonial Prize Cases, p. 229.) 
The T /~;or 'vas condemned as la ,v£ul prize. 
Liability of the "Petro."-The nationality o£ the 
Petro, the tanker fro1n 'vhich the cruiser Xerxes o£ State 
X is refueling is not stated. I£ it was a naval tanker it 
'vould be liable to the san1e treatment as a vessel o£ war. 
If it 'vas a tanker o\vned by private enemy parti~s, it 
'vould be serving as an auxiliary and would be liable tu 
be sunk. I£ it 'vas a neutral tanker it would be similarly 
liable as engaged in unneutral service. Such a neutral 
vessel has so far identified itself with the belligerent as 
to render itself liable to the same treatment as a bel-
ligerent vessel. 
Sttb?nerged reefs.-,Vhile there have been arguments 
fro1n ti1ne to time in favor of the determination of juris-
diction over coastal waters based on navigability or upon 
depth, such arguments have not been generally accepted. 
If the principle o£ navigability had been accepted, the 
problem o£ fixing the depth line for draft o£ ships would 
have had 1nany analogies to the problem o£ the range of 
cannon shot. There would have been other problems 
arising fro1n the changing and shifting depths o£ waters 
along certain coasts. 
In August, 192::5, certain questions arose in the case-of 
United States v. Henning et al. in regard to the status 
of Sea Horse Reef, 16 1niles off the 'vest coast of Florida. 
It was contended that this was a part of the coast of the 
United States, but the court did not "concede this con-
struction." (7 Fed. 2d series, p. 488.) 
Neutral rights and duties .-Fro1n the varied practice 
and theories, it is apparent that there is not complete 
agreement as to jurisdiction over waters off a coast dotted 
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'vith islands, reefs, etc. By article 1 o£ XIII Hague 
Convention belligerents are bound to respect the rights 
o£ neutral po"~ers. It can not be prestuned that a Yessel 
taking fuel in neutral jurisdiction is necessarily exceed-
ing its rights, but by article 25 o£ XIII Hague Con-
vention, 
A neutral Power is bound to exercise such sun~eillance as the 
means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation of the pro-
Yisions of the above Articles occurring in its ports or roadsteads 
or in its waters. (1908, XaYal 'Var College, International Law 
Situation, p. 220.) 
I£ a belligerent protests to a neutral that an ene1ny is 
violating a provision o£ the la,vs o£ neutrality and the 
neutral takes no action, the belligerent n1ay presu1ne that 
the neutral is not able to prevent the violation or that it 
does not regard the contention as valid. A neutral is 
not obliged to asstune jurisdiction along its coast beyond 
3 miles. The belligerent must then determine 'vhat ac-
tion to take for its o"~n protection and i£ under ordinary 
conditions no possibility o£ violation o£ neutral rights 
'vere involYecl the belligerent 1night la,v£ully attack its 
ene1ny. 
I£ one belligerent attacks another, even 'vithin neutral 
jurisdiction, the attacked belligerent 1nay law·fully defend 
itself £ro1n such attack and so far as possible render its 
enmny unable to contint1e operations. 
P11otective jurisdiction.-That a certain degree of pro-
tective jurisdiction 1nay in specific case extend beyond 
the 3-Inile jurisdiction is acbnitted. In 1864 in referring 
to the French position that the Alabanra and f{ earsarge 
should not engage .in such proxi1nity to the French coast 
as 'vould put it in danger fron1 shell fire, the United 
States, "~hile heeding the request, did not ad1nit that 
French jurisdiction extended beyond 3 miles. (1904, 
Naval War College, International La 'v Situations, pp. 
132-134.) In the san1e year the question 'vas again 
raised 'vhen the U. S. S. Rhode Island fired upon the 
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JJ! argaret and Jessie off Eluthera and the British Gov-
erinnent expressed the opinion : 
that vessels should not fire toward a neutral shore at a less dis-
tance than that which would insure shot not falling into neutral 
waters, or in a neutral territory. (Ibid., p. 135.) 
Belligerent control of neutral ruessels.-.. A. belligerent is 
entitled to humane treatinent in tin1e o:f distress. l'his 
'vas provided :for in the 1907 Hague ConYention :for the 
Adaptation to Naval War o:f the Principles o:f the Ge-
neYa Conyention. For example, article 9 is to the :follo,v-
ing effect: 
Belligerents may a1111eal to the cllarity of the commanders of 
neutral 1nerchant ships, ~rachts, or boats to take on board and 
tend the sick and wounded. 
Vessels responding to this appeal, and also ves~els which have 
of their own accord rescued sick, wounded. or shipwrecked men, 
shall enjoy special proteetion and certain inununities. In no case 
can they be ~aptured for having such persons on board, but, apart 
from s11ecial undertakings that have been made to them, they re-
main liable to capture for any violations of neutrality they may 
have committed. (1908, Naval 'Var College, International Law 
Situations, 11. 205.) 
'fhis article 9 refers to neutral Yessels 'vhich o:f their 
o'vn accord take on board sick, ".,.ounded, or ship,vrecked 
1nen and to neutral Yessels 'vhich on request take on 
board sick and " rounded. 
The reference to " sick and wounded " in the first 
paragraph and to "sick, 'vounded, or shipwrecked" in 
the second paragraph of article 9 'vas not by inadvert-
ence but 'vas considered at The Hague Conference in 
1907. l\1. Louis Renault, the reporter :for the subcom-
Inission which had this conYention In charge, in the 
discussion, says: 
In 1899 it was asked what should be the fate of the sick, 
wounded, and shipwrecked. They may, as a 1natter of fact, be 
in very different situations: on hospital shi11s of the State, on 
hospital ships of national or neutral relief societies, or on nler-
chant vessels of hostile or neutral nationality. There has been 
much discussion on tltis 11oint, and very different solutions have 
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been introduced into the additional articles of 1868. .After Ina-
ture reflection, we agreed to base our action on a very shnple 
princi11le: A belligerent \Yho duly has in his possession com-
batants of the aclYersary has a right to make then1 prisoners of 
war; if the co1nbatants are sick or wounded, it is his duty to 
care for them. It· is only necessary to apply this 11rinciple to 
the various cases which may arise: A cruiser 1neets a hospital 
ship (batiment hopital) or a "hospitable" ship (bathnent hos-
pitalier), and has a right to search it and supervise what takes 
place thereon. It finds sick, wounded, and shipwrecked persons, 
and has an absolute right to consider the1n as prisoners. In 
most cases, as far as the sick and wounded are concerned, it is 
entirely to the advantage of the cruiser to lea Ye then1 where 
they are, for it would have to transport and care for thmn. But 
it 1nay also happen that it will be in its interest to treat some 
of them as prisoners; this is more particularly the case with 
the shipwrecked persons. It matters little on board of what 
vessel these sick, wounded, or shipwrecked persons are found, 
provided they are duly in the possession of the enen1y. This is 
the case whenever a belligerent cruiser meets on the high seas 
any Yessel other than a neutral war Yessel. ( 3 Proceedings of 
the Hague Peace Conferences, Carnegie Endown1ent for Inter-
national Peace, p. 568.) 
Salvaging.-Salvaging of public ships by private 
agencies may be on the same basis as the salvaging of 
private ships. The difficulties that have 1nost often arisen 
have been in connection 'vith the payment for such serv-
ices when it has been in1possible for the salvor to bring 
action against the public ships. As 'Yas said in the· 
British court in the case of the Porto .Alexandre ( [1920]. 
P., p. 30.) : 
These are n1atters to be dealt with by negotiations between 
governments, and not by governn1ents exercising their power to 
interfere \Vith the property of other States contrary to the prin-
ciples of international courtes;y which govern the relations be-
tween independent and sovereign States. 
That salvaging operations of a neutral on the high sea 
in behalf of one belligerent should not interfere 'vith the 
exercise of the rights of the other belligerent as against 
his enemy is achnitted ""ithout argument. Indeed the 
neutral salvaging vessel n1ust to escape risk avoid any 
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participation in the hostilities and ll!ay act only for the 
preservation of the vessel of ·war against the forces of 
nature. The salvaging must be clearly distinguished 
fron1 obligations 'vhich 1night arise under the Hague· 
Convention for the A ..daptation to Naval 'Var of the-
J->rinci ples of the Geneva Convention. 
Discussion, 1930.-Certain matters in regard to the-
general nature of salvage arose in the consideration of 
Situation II and the discussion 1nay be found in Naval 
"'\Var College, International La,v Situations, 1930, pages. 
84-90. 
Obligation to rescue.-While the obligation of a neu--
tral private vessel to rescue shipwrecked personnel of a. 
vessel of 'var may be recognized, there is no obligation to-
take the personnel from a vessel of \\7ar in antici patjon. 
that it may be sunk by an ene1ny. 
Vessels of 'var are subject to the risks of ·war. 
Neutral private vessels are under no obligations to· 
participate to the ad vantage of either belligerent. 
· The fact that a vessel of war of one belligerent can not 
accommodate on board the personnel of an enemy yessel 
of 'var does not place a neutral under special obligation 
to either party. 
By article 16 of the 1907 Hague Convention for the· 
Adaptation to Naval War of the Principles of the Geneva 
Convention, it is prescribed that: 
After every engagement, the two belligerents, so far as mili-
tary interests pern1it, shall take steps to look for the ship-
wrecked, sick, and wounded, and to protect them, as well as 
the dead, against pillage and ill treatment. (1908, Naval 'Var 
College, International Law Situations, p. 207.) 
SOLUTION 
(a) As neutral State R takes no aetion, the action of 
submarine Y 50 is la,vful. The defense of crtuser 
Xerwes is la,vful, but the taking of the crew of the.. 
beached Y 50 as pris.oners of war is not lawful. 
State X has no ground for valid protest. 
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State Y may protest against the taking of the cre\v 
of Y 50 as prisoners of war. 
State R may protest against the action of the X erwes 
in entering its \Vaters and making the cre\v of Y 50 
prisoners of war. 
(b) The place of salvaging is in the high sea and the 
salvaging operations are la,vful. The salvaging vessel is 
under obligation to cease operations but under no obli-
gation to take the crew of the Xenophon on board. The 
relative weakness of the submarine Y 51 gives it no right 
to demand exceptional services from the salvaging vessel. 
The Xenophon's armament and boats being intact, the 
conditions for which the Hague-Geneva Convention pro-
vides have not arisen, and the salvaging vessel may de-
cline to take any action except to discontinue salvaging 
operations unless upon agreement of all parties. 
